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5.1  Introduction 
The Japanese distribution system has been criticized domestically and inter- 
nationally. It is well known that many Japanese consumer products, such as 
cameras and VCRs, are sold cheaper in New York than in Tokyo. Korean cars, 
successful  in the United  States, are virtually  nonexistent  in Japan. Famous 
brand-name goods, such as Louis Vuitton, Hermes, Chivas Regal, and Cour- 
voisier, imported from Europe, are sold in Japan with extraordinary premia. 
The “price differential between home and abroad” (Nuigui  kukaku sa) has be- 
come an important political problem in Japan. 
Suspected causes for the price differential are the so-called Japanese char- 
acteristics in the distribution  system. Many small (family-run)  retail stores, 
which cannot exploit scale economies, have survived thanks to the restriction 
on the construction and operation (store hours) of large retail (e.g., discount) 
stores in the neighborhood of  small stores. Some of the many layers of  whole- 
sale  industry  seem  unnecessary.  The  (vertically  semi-integrated)  keiretsu 
stores carry only one (domestic) brand, discriminating against other domestic 
brands  as well  as imports.  Sole representative  agents for imports in  many 
imported goods enjoy its monopolistic rents, reducing the volume (and dollar 
value) of imports, given that they deal with differentiated products. 
The situation described above is often stereotyped as the inefficient distri- 
bution  system that  incurs unnecessary distribution  costs and  discriminates 
against imports. Two major questions and issues can be distinguished.  First, 
Takatoshi It0 is professor of Economics, Hitotsubashi University and the University of  Minne- 
sota, and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Masayoshi Maruy- 
ama is Associate Professor at Department of Business Administration at Kobe University. 
The authors wish to thank David Flath and other conference participants for their comments. 
Comments from Mark Ramseyer, Kiyohiko Nishimura, and Graham Elliott were helpful in revis- 
ing this paper. 
149 150  Takatoshi It0 and Masayoshi Maruyama 
it  is important to investigate whether the unique characteristics result in the 
“inefficiency” of the distribution  system in Japan. The distribution system is 
said to be efficient if the distribution system does not add unnecessary costs in 
the pipeline from a manufacturer to a consumer. 
Second, the distribution system might act as a non-tariff barrier, which lim- 
its competition from abroad. This could happen even if the distribution system 
is “efficient”  in terms of the pipeline  costs.  Suppose that  the  manufacturer 
charges a  higher  domestic price  than  export price,  and/or  that  importers 
charge higher domestic  wholesale  prices than their import costs, then retail 
prices would be higher. Put differently, if the prices charged upon entry to the 
pipeline are already high, then the retail prices would be high even under the 
same distribution margin through the pipeline. 
This paper investigates the first question, namely the efficiency of the Jap- 
anese distribution  system. Most of  the discussions on the Japanese distribu- 
tion system have so far relied on institutional descriptions and anecdotal evi- 
dence, failing to substantiate the case, one way or the other, with quantitative 
measures. The present paper will show that the Japanese and U.S. distribution 
sectors are about the same in terms of value added and distribution margins. 
Therefore, it is not true that the distribution sector adds up unnecessary distri- 
bution costs or earns monopolistic operating profits. 
This paper will not address the second question, namely, whether the distri- 
bution  system is acting as a non-tariff barrier.  Thus, even if the distribution 
sector in Japan is judged to be “efficient,” it leaves open a possibility that the 
distribution  system works as a barrier  to potential  new  entrants  from both 
home  and  foreign  manufacturers. The price differential  between  home  and 
abroad can be a result of oligopolistic pricing behavior of manufacturers. Jap- 
anese manufacturers  may  set domestic  wholesale  prices higher than export 
price. Foreign manufacturers may charge higher export prices on goods bound 
for Japan than on those for other markets. The price differential may be rein- 
forced by  the exclusive keiretsu  distribution  system. If  this  scenario is the 
case, the efficiency of the distribution system implies that the monopoly rents 
are not shared by the distribution sector. This paper does not verify how likely 
this scenario is. 
The rest of the paper consists of four sections. The next section will sum- 
marize the conventional wisdom of the Japanese distribution system. Section 
5.3 will propose  several measures to judge the efficiency of the distribution 
system. Some preliminary  investigations on the U.S .-Japan comparison will 
be conducted. Section 5.4 is the core of this paper.  It will investigate distri- 
bution margins of the (comparable) three-digit wholesale and two-digit retail 
sectors for the United States and Japan. Interpretations of the finding will be 
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5.2  Conventional Wisdom 
Perceived characteristics of the Japanese distribution system can be  sum- 
marized as follows. 
1. Many small establishments.  Wholesale and retail stores are of  small 
size both in the number of employees and in sales. They cannot adopt tech- 
nological advances that take advantage of scale economies. This characteristic 
also discriminates against imports as well as any new products because finan- 
cially weak establishments cannot experiment with new products at their own 
risk. 
2. Many layers. The distribution system has “many layers and is complex,” 
in that there are relatively many distributors involved in the distribution sys- 
tem that stretches from the makers’ warehouses to the consumer. Sometimes 
there are three different wholesalers involved from the manufacturer to the 
retailer.  This  makes the distribution  system inefficient; that is, distribution 
costs in the consumer price is higher than optimal. 
3. Distribution  keiretsu.  Manufacturers develop their exclusive distribu- 
tion systems. For example, Panasonic stores, Sony stores, Toshiba stores, and 
so on carry a set of consumer electronic products, but exclusively their own 
brands. This vertical semi-integration makes it difficult for new entrants, in- 
cluding imports, to penetrate the market. The new entrant would need to es- 
tablish its own distributors. The operation would involve a large risk that few 
foreign firms would like to take. 
4.  Unique trading practices  (i.e., returns policy, sales persons on loan, 
price  maintenance,  and  rebate  system).  There  are  a  number  of  so-called 
unique trading practices that makes the distribution system in Japan “compli- 
cated” and “inefficient.” 
Returns from retail stores to the wholesaler are often allowed even if  the 
retail stores bought the merchandise. In this sense a returns policy of unsold 
merchandise is said to be “liberal” (from retail to wholesale stores) (henpin 
sei). Many department stores and other large retail stores are staffed with “per- 
sons on  loan” from manufacturers to retail stores. Although they are on the 
manufacturer’s payroll,  they act as sales persons who demonstrate and pro- 
mote  the products  in the department  store.  Retail prices  are often  “main- 
tained” by  implicit agreement between the manufacturers and the retailers via 
wholesalers. Rebates between retailers and wholesalers are just a means of 
nonlinear pricing. However, it is alleged that the terms of rebates are often not 
spelled out beforehand, but left to the discretion of wholesalers and manufac- 
turers. 
5.  Dai-ten Ho. The policy using Dai-ten Ho (an acronym of the law and its 
implementation, concerning the restriction on the construction of and on the 
operating hours of  large-scale retail stores) makes it difficult for large-size 
retail  stores (discount stores, department  stores, and supermarkets) to take 
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smaller retail stores (see 2 above), Dai-ten Ho works against benefits of for- 
eign makers as well as the Japanese consumers. 
6. Sole representative importer. Many products are imported to Japan by 
sole representative importers. If  the Japanese consumers have lower price 
elasticity for brand-name goods, then the sole representative importers of 
brand-name goods would find it profitable to charge a higher price for the 
goods in Japan than in the rest of the world. This would be not sustainable if 
parallel imports were permitted and costless. 
7. Personal relationships and long-term contracts. It is said that, in order 
to make business deals, establishing a “personal relationship” is needed in 
addition to a long-term relationship, marked by  a reliable delivery record 
(even if  this implies expensive overtime on the part of makers and wholesale 
businesses) and by after-sale service. 
5.2.1  Many Small Establishments 
The characteristic of  many small establishments in Japan can be  seen in 
three different statistics in table 5.1  . 
First, the number of  workers (both employees and self-employed) per es- 
tablishments are compared. The Japanese retail stores are, on average, oper- 
ated by  about four persons. In fact, more than half of  the retail stores have 
only one or two persons running the shop. The number of persons per estab- 
Table 5.1  Many Small Establishments, International Comparison 
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Source: Maruyama et al. (1989). 
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lishment  is  about  a half  of  that  in the United  States and two-thirds that in 
Germany. Workers per wholesale establishment in Japan is about three-fourths 
of that in the United States; but it is comparable to that in Germany. 
Second, the number of  establishments per  1,000 residents is much higher 
in Japan than in the United States or Germany. This is true in both the whole- 
sale and retail sectors. Retailers and wholesalers in Japan are about twice as 
dense as in the United States or Germany. 
Third, the average Japanese retailer has about one-third the floor space of 
the German counterpart. This could be a result of  the high price of land in 
Japan. 
These statistics confirm that the establishments are run by a smaller number 
of  persons  in  Japan  and  there are more  establishments  per  capita than  the 
United States and Germany. 
Is this Japanese characteristic changing? Table 5.2 shows the time series of 
the workers per establishment  for wholesale and retail  sectors. The average 
number of workers per establishment has in fact declined recently, after peak- 
ing  in  1972. The wholesale  structure  shows  no evidence  that  the  size of 
wholesale establishments are increasing at all. 
On the retail side, however, workers per retail establishment is steadily in- 
creasing. Especially  after 1982, the number of  individual establishments  is 
declining, while the number of  workers continues to grow. This results in an 
acceleration in this statistic. However, even with the increased pace over the 
period  1982-88,  it would take 20 years to catch up with  Germany  and 40 
years to catch up with the United States in terms of the workers per establish- 
ment. 
5.2.2 
After the Japanese goods leave a manufacturer’s warehouse, they typically 
go through more than one wholesaler.  Japanese wholesalers tend to be more 
specialized in one type of goods, and sometimes specialize exclusively on one 
brand. Yet there are many wholesalers involved between the manufacturer and 
customers. For some goods, there may be a “secondary wholesaler,” and even 
a “tertiary wholesaler” in addition to a “primary wholesaler.” Although prac- 
tice differs from commodity to commodity, and sometimes brand to brand, a 
stylized notion of “many layers” is true in the sense that even discount stores 
and large super market chains are often unable to purchase directly from man- 
ufacturers. 
A primary wholesaler could be a manufacturer’s subsidiary. In that case, it 
deals with their own brands exclusively.  (Examples include consumer elec- 
tronics, cosmetics, detergent, and cameras.) In other cases, a primary whole- 
saler deals with other brands.  A secondary wholesaler is typically a regional 
distributor,  and  a tertiary  wholesaler  is a  local  distributor.  In  an extreme, 
large-scale retailers  typically obtain goods from makers via a wholesaler in 
Japan, but without a wholesaler in the United States. 
Many Layers within the Wholesale Industry Table 5.2  Many Small Establishments, TSme  Series, Japan 
1958  1960  1962  1964  1966  1968  1970  1972  1974 
Wholesale 
Number of  establishments 
per residents  193  226  223  229  287  240  256  259  292 
Number of workers  1,551  1,928  2,129  2,524  3,042  2,697  2,861  3,008  3,290 
Workers per  establishment  8.0  8.5  9.5  11.0  10.6  11.2  11.1  11.6  11.2 
Retail 
Number of establishments  1,245  1,288  1,272  1,305  1,315  1,432  1,47  1  1,496  1,548 
Number of workers  3,273  3,489  3,550  3,811  4,193  4,646  4,926  5,141  5,303 
Workers per establishment  2.6  2.7  2.8  2.9  3.0  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.4 
1976  1979  1982  1985  1988 
Wholesale 
Number of establishments  340,249  368,608  428,858  41 3,016  436,502 
Number of workers  3,5 12,973  3,672,638  4,090,919  3,998,437  4,331,601 
Workers per establishment  10.3  10.0  9.5  9.7  9.9 
Retail 
Number of establishments  1,614,067  1,673,661  1,721,465  1,628,644  1,619,599 
Number of workers  5,579,800  5,960,432  6,369,426  6,328,614  6,850,478 
Workers per establishment  3.5  3.6  3.1  3.9  4.2 
Source: MITI, Census of  Commerce. 
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Table 5.3  Wholesale/Retail (WIR) Ratio 
Japan  United States  Germany 
WIR in sales 
1982  3.53  1.09  1.61' 
1985  3.44  .91b  1  .So' 
1982  1.60  .82  1.17d 
1985  1.55  .Sb  1.17 
WIR in number of 
establishments: 
1982  ,225  ,176  .29@ 
1985  ,229  N.A.  ,292' 
WIR for inventories 
~~ 
Source: Maruyama et al. (1989). 





As a measure of many layers in the wholesale industry, it is popular to use 
the wholesaleIretai1 (WIR)  sales ratio. We will explain the WIR ratio and then 
propose an additional measure. The WIR sales ratio in Japan is significantly 
higher than that in the United States or Germany (see table 5.3, row 1). 
The high  WIR ratio is interpreted  as a  reflection  of  many  layers  in  the 
wholesale industry because sales of the same commodity are double or triple 
counted as wholesale sales in the multilayered wholesale industry structure. 
However, a high WIR ratio may be a result of another characteristic. Instead 
of  the wholesale level  being multilayered, the retail establishments  may be 
especially small in size. If the retail sales per establishment (discussed in the 
next section) is small due to its small scale of operations (implied by the work- 
ers per establishment data given in table 5. l),  then a high WIR ratio would be 
obtained. Therefore, the WIR ratio alone is not conclusive evidence of  the 
multilayered nature. 
We can measure the proportion of  sales to other wholesalers in total sales, 
as  shown  in  table 5.4. This table clearly  shows that  more sales between 
wholesalers take place in Japan, a piece of evidence for multilayered whole- 
sale industry. Indeed, there are many layers in the wholesale industry. 
1. Note that the WIR sales ratio can be decomposed into: 
Sales per establishment, wholesale 
Sales per establishment, retail 
Number of establishments per 1 ,OOO  residents 
Number of  establishments per  1  ,OOO  residents 
X 
Therefore, if sales per establishment in retail in one country is extremely low, the WIR ratio would 
be higher, even though other components are comparable with other countries. 156  Takatoshi Ito and Masayoshi Maruyama 
Table 5.4  Proportion of Wholesale Sales by Class of Customers (%) 
Customer class 
Japan  United States  West Germany 
(1982)  (1982)  (1986) 
Other wholesalers  41.9  24.8  16.2 
Retailers and repair shops  24.0  28.0  30.0 
Household and individual  .6  1.6  2.8 
Industrial users, manufacturing 
and mining  ...  15.0  26.8 
Others  26.1  20.8  9.2 
Export  I .4  9.8  14.9 
Source: Maruyama et al. (1989). Data source: Japan, Census of  Commerce, 1982. (These were 
adjusted by  deducting the transactions between companies’ headquarters and branches. These 
data cover manufacturers’  and other industrial companies’ sales branches and offices, and exclude 
agents and commission merchants.) United States, 1982 Census of  Wholesale Trade (WC82-1-4) 
(only  merchange  wholesalers).  Germany,  Handel,  Gastgewerbe,  Reiseverkehr  Fachserie 6 
(Reihe, 1.3 Warensortiment sowie Bezugs und Absatzwege im Grosshandel  1986) (exports in- 
clude those to East Germany). 
5.2.3  Theoretical Justifications 
There are two opposite views on how to understand the existence of many 
small retail and multilevel wholesale stores in Japan. The first view is that 
these characteristics are efficient results of  Japanese consumer’s preference 
and spatial limitations. (See Flath 1988, 1989a; Maruyama 1988). The second 
view is that they are largely a result of regulations (see McCraw and O’Brien 
1986). 
The first view is developed as follows. Many  small retail establishments 
(neighborhood stores) are considered to be a rational result of the consumer’s 
diet and buying habit.  Suppose that the Japanese consumer prefers to shop 
every day in small lots in neighborhood stores. Fresh raw fish must be pur- 
chased every day, not once a week. Moreover, a refrigerator is too small to 
store a whole week’s inventories, and automobiles are inefficient to use in 
congested urban areas. Then, this explains the existence of many small retail 
stores. In a sense, the large number of shops are a substitute for a household’s 
trip and stock costs. Although establishments that are small seem inefficient, 
they are usually family-run establishments physically adjacent to the home, 
with low overhead costs and rents. 
The existence of  many  small retail shops requires extra layers (primary 
wholesale, secondary wholesale, etc.) of the distribution system if organiza- 
tional (monitoring) costs approximately fix an optimal number of retailers (or 
other  wholesalers) per  one  wholesaler. This would  explain the  multilevel 
wholesalers in Japan. 
The second view  is that these Japanese characteristics are indications of 
some distortions in the market. Even if roads are congested, public transpor- 
tation is fully developed in Japan, and consumers are quite mobile. There is 157  Is  the Japanese Distribution System Really Inefficient? 
no reason to suppose that retailers have to be  close by.  Even if many  small 
retail stores are given, the ratio of wholesalers could be less in Japan, as re- 
tailers are located close together geographically. In short, we would expect, 
in more densely populated Japan, a lower ratio of  stores to population. Ac- 
cording to this view, the wholesale/retail ratio should be  less in Japan than 
other countries.2  The stylized facts described above should be a result of some 
regulations, such as Dai-ten  Ho. 
5.2.4 
The conventional wisdom on keiretsu can be understood as follows. Kei- 
retsu stores in  the wholesale and retail level are controlled by the respective 
manufacturers. In the keiretsu stores, manufacturers control decisions, such 
as which brands to carry, how much discount from the “standard retail price” 
(or retail price wished by the maker, in the literal translation) can be allowed, 
and how  to deal with unsold inventories. In  that sense, the essential part of 
keiretsu in the distribution sector is a package of  “vertical restraints” in the 
sense of Flath (1  989b). 
Often wholesalers and retailers exclusively deal with one manufacturer. In 
order to maintain resale prices, the manufacturer has to accept unsold goods 
as returns. Otherwise, the retail stores face too much risk in their earnings in 
the presense of  uncertain demand. In a sense, the so-called liberal returns 
policy (henpin sei) and the price maintenance system can be understood as a 
result of  a profit maximization of an oligopolist with differentiated products 
that has a keiretsu power to impose vertical restraints and whose retailers face 
an uncertain demand curve. (This point is forcefully shown in Flath  1989a 
and Flath and Nariu 1989.) According to this view, there is nothing “unfair” 
or “inefficient” about “liberal” returns policy in Japan. If there is any problem, 
it is an institution (or a lack of strict enforcement of fair trade law) that allows 
oligopolistic vertical restraints by manufacturers with differentiated products. 
There is a controversy as to whether keiretsu stores are a real cause of nai- 
gai kakaku sa. Some argue that many keiretsu stores deal with more than one 
brand (Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha 1989, p. 84). However, no estimate of  the 
number of such stores is provided. 
Another “unique” business practice in Japan is worth mentioning. Namely, 
many department stores are staffed by “persons on loan” from manufacturers 
or wholesalers. The statistics shows that in 12 departments, (sales) persons on 
loan outnumber own (sales) persons. The Japanese department stores use their 
basement floors as food and grocery sections. They are usually operated and 
staffed as branches of small retail stores, and sales persons are usually on loan 
Keiretsu and “Unique” Trading Practices 
2. David Flath drew our attention to  the following fact. When the numbers of stores per thou- 
sand households are compared for different prefectures in Japan, both Tokyo (most densely popu- 
lated) and  Hokkaido (most sparsely populated) record the lowest. The number of retail stores 
excluding eating and drinking places for Japan’s average is 45.5, while Tokyo is 35.1 and Hok- 
kaido is 34.1. The comparable number for the United States is 23.8. 158  Takatoshi Ito and Masayoshi Maruyama 
from respective retail stores. Therefore, the department store with  a larger 
food section, such as Keihin Tokyu, tends to have a higher ratio of sales per- 
sons on loan. A new branch of a department store chain also tends to have a 
higher ratio (see Ito and Maruyama 1989, table 2-5). 
The Japanese department stores also have comers for brand-name merchan- 
dise, such as cosmetics, jewelry, handbags, and apparel. These sections also 
have a higher ratio of  persons on  loan.  Manufacturers also send people to 
retail stores when they think demonstration of new merchandise would help 
sales.3 Another reason for manufacturers to send sales persons is to directly 
gather information on the customer’s reaction to the products and to utilize 
this information in product development. 
For department stores, the significant numbers of  persons on loan would 
cause the upward bias for their productivity (sales per person). In fact, when 
productivities in the retail sectors are examined by size of the establishments, 
those with more than 500 employees have extremely high productivities (see 
Maruyama et al. 1989). A significant portion of high productivities are due to 
the “persons on loan .” 
5.2.5 
In  1956, in order to curb the growth of department stores, the Department 
Store Law, which required a permit for new construction, was enacted. Then, 
large supermarkets, discount stores, and other large chain stores, which were 
not covered by the Department Store Law, became popular. In order to cover 
these new types of retail stores, the Large-Scale Retail Store Law, or Dai-ten 
Ho, which requires a “reporting” of constructions, replaced the Department 
Store Law in 1974. It was revised in 1979 to its current form. 
The Dai-ten Ho  covers two types of  stores: first, stores with 1,500 square 
meters or more than 3,000 square meters in large cities (seirei shitei toshi); 
second, stores with 500-1,500  square meters or stores with 500-3,000  square 
meters that are located in large cities.  A construction plan of  a large retail 
store has to be submitted to a governor (of prefecture). Then the sho cho kyo 
(the committee of  adjusting retail activities), which is organized under the 
Chamber  of  Commerce,  “discusses” the  plan.  For the first type  of  store, 
the report from the dai ten shin (subcommittee of large retail stores) goes to 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) minister. For the sec- 
ond type of  store, the report goes to the governor. The “adjustment” items 
include the floor space, the opening day, store hours, and total days closed in 
a year. On appearance, when a plan is submitted, it should be discussed with 
neighboring shopping malls and stores and be approved in due time. 
However, the law is not the whole story. The MITI issues the ministry guid- 
Large-Scale Retail Store Law (Dai-ten  Ho) 
3. Flath (1989a) applies Telser’s (1960) argument of  resale price maintenance to the vertical 
restraint behavior (keiretsu) among Japanese firms. However, Telser’s argument, which empha- 
sizes the merit of “demonstration,” can be applied to the characteristic “persons on loan” in Japan, 
too. 159  Is the Japanese Distribution System Really Inefficient? 
ance on interpretation and implementation of the law. In fact, in the beginning 
of the 1980s, the implementation was significantly tightened so that it became 
not  uncommon to take more than two years after a submission of  a plan re- 
ceive final approval. In essense, the law and its implementation can virtually 
stop the construction of a large retail store if the neighboring stores oppose it. 
The time required to build and operate a large-scale retail store, according 
to the practices of Dai-ten Ho, can be anything between two and one-half 
years to 10 years. First, the management of the prospective store has to “ex- 
plain” the plan, including the floor space and the days of operation, to local 
businesses as well as to the Chamber of Commerce and the local government 
of  the prospective store site. Only after the Chamber of  Commerce and the 
local stores “agree” to the plan may the prospective store file an application 
(Article 3 application) for the building permit. If the local businesses express 
strong opposition, it may take many years before the application is filed. This 
is based on the practices imposed by  the MITI rather than on the letter of 
the law. 
The governor will send the Article 3 application to the MITI minister. The 
MITI then asks the local Chamber of Commerce whether the proposed store 
would affect the existing local businesses. If the answer is no, the prospective 
store may file an Article 5 application to the governor and it will be approved. 
However, in many cases the answer is yes. Then the proposed store and the 
local business must meet in the “pre-council” (jizen sho cho kyo). This pro- 
cess takes about eight months. After the pre-council is cleared, the store can 
file an Article 5 application to the governor. The governor sends the Article 5 
application to the MITI minister. Then the formal council (sho  cho kyo),  com- 
posed of the local businesses, the Chamber of Commerce, the store, consum- 
ers, and some academics, examines (i) when the store will open for business; 
(ii) floor space; (iii) store hours; and (iv) the number of  store holidays in a 
year. This practice is close to a “hearing” in the U.S. case. The Chamber of 
Commerce may express its opinion in the council. The Large-Scale Retail 
Store Commission [Shingikui] examines the case, and the local government 
expresses its opinion. Then, following the Shingikai’s discussions, the MITI 
minister makes recommendations on the conditions for building the store. Fi- 
nally, the MITI minister will approve the plan. After the Article 5 application 
is filed, approval has to be given within five months. 
A most time-consuming part is, in fact, not a part of the law but merely the 
“practices” and gyosei shido of the MITI. In particular, the “pre-explanation” 
is not a code or gyosei shido, but just a practice. However, some local govern- 
ments do not accept an Article 3 application without an agreement from the 
Chamber of  Commerce.  The local business could simply boycott the “pre- 
explanation” so that it could take forever before an Article 3 application could 
filed. 
In the case of the Summit Store, Higashi Nakano, it took about seven years 
from the time the plan was made to the time the store actually opened. It really 160  Takatoshi It0 and Masayoshi Maruyama 
took a long time before the Article 3 application was filed. (The details of the 
negotiation are documented in Nikkei Business  [5 June 19891 and reproduced 
in Ito and Maruyama 1989, p. 21 .) 
Let us turn to the issue of how the Dai-ten Ho affects efficiency. David Flath 
(1988) investigated how  the number of other types of  stores change as the 
number of department stores change in different prefectures. He finds that the 
number of  drug stores is not affected by  the number of  department stores, 
while the number of food, liquor, and apparel stores are quite elastic. This 
partly but not entirely explains how the Dai-ten Ho  allows many small stores 
to survive. It should also be pointed out that Dai-ten Ho protects the “insid- 
ers,’’ that is, the existing department stores, from the “outsiders,” that is, the 
proposed department stores. 
5.3  Measures of Efficiency in the Distribution Sector 
There have been many studies on productivity and efficiency in the distri- 
bution sector. The most popular measure of the productivity and efficiency of 
the distribution system has been “sales per employee,” as in  Ingene (1982) 
and Smith and Hitchens (1985). The latter compared the productivities of the 
U.S.  and  European distribution systems. When data are available, “value 
added per employee” is also used, as in Beckman (1957). As explained in the 
text, there are some conceptual difficulties in the use of  these measures as a 
criteria for efficiency. Several authors (see Bucklin 1978; Achaval 1984) have 
also expressed caution against the use of these measures. The Japanese distri- 
bution system in the light of international comparison was studied in Tajima 
and Miyashita (1985), Ryutsu Keizai Kenkyusho (1988), and Maruyama et 
al. (1989). 
This section proposes looking at the gross margin, operating expenses, 
operating profit, and unit labor cost. We  relied on data from the commerce 
censuses of  the United States and those of  Japan, such as the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry’s White Paper (1988, p. 73;  Nishimura and 
Tsubouchi 1989 calculated the gross margin from the input-output table). 
A contribution of this paper, which we will present in the next section, is 
that it compares not only gross margins but also operating expenses, operating 
profits, and unit labor costs at the three-digit wholesale and two-digit retail 
sectors, using the comparable commerce censuses in the United States and 
Japan. 
Given all facts about the “uniqueness” of the Japanese distribution system, 
an important question from the economic point of  view is whether it is  an 
inefficient system, as is often claimed. We proposed constructing several mea- 
sures to evaluate the efficiency of the distribution sector. 
5.3.1 
“Sales per worker” or “Sales per establishment”  has been a popular measure 
for “performance” and “efficiency.” For example, the measure was used  in 
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Takeuchi and Bucklin (1977) and cited by  Rangan (1989), and is reproduced 
in table 5.5. Rangan concluded from this figure that “the performance of the 
Japanese counterpart was  significantly worse.” First of  all, this data is old, 
and second, there is a question as to whether this measure really reflects per- 
formance and efficiency. 
Table 5.6,shows more recent data of the same measure. In this table, Japan 
does not look inefficient, except for the measure of “retail sales per establish- 
Table 5.5  Productivity Measured by Sales 
Japan  United States 
Year  Sales  Year  Sales 
Retail sales per establishment  1952 
1958 
1968 
Retail sales per worker  1952 
1958 
1968 
Number of  retail establishments  1952 
per  1  ,OOO  residents  1958 
1968 
5.8  1948 
10.6  1958 
28.0  1967 
2.6  1948 
3.7  1958 
8.0  1967 
14.  I  1948 
15.7  1958 










Source: Rangan (1989). citing Takeuchi and Bucklin (1977). 
Note: In thousands of dollars, 360 yen to the dollar, deflated using the Japanese retail price index, 
1968 base year (Japan). 
Table 5.6  Productivity Measured by Sales, 1979-85 
Japan  United States  Germany 






































Source: Maruyama et al. (1989). 
Nore: Figures in data cols. represent amounts in $l,OOO. This is measured in PPP exchange rate 
of  DECD; that is, $1  = DM 2.54 in 1979; $1  = 237 yen in  1982; $1  = 222 yen = DM 2.48 
in  1985. 
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ment.”  The wholesale sector look quite comparable to or better than other 
countries. 
There are two caveats. First, productivity in the Japanese wholesale sector 
could be overestimated, because large scale trading houses (sogo shosha) are 
included in the wholesale sector. Trading houses engage in  export,  import, 
and international trade between third countries as well as domestic retail busi- 
ness. Second, the productivities in the retail sectors may be biased upward, 
because of the “persons on loan” in large scale department stores. (See the 
argument on persons on loan in sec. 5.2 above). Another contamination is the 
inclusion of eating and drinking places in retail business. 
5.3.2  Value Added 
However, the amount of  sales is not a good measure of productivity. First, 
it does not consider any costs of input. Compare a retail store that deals with 
expensive products (say, diamonds) with high purchase (input) prices (from 
wholesale level) and a retail store that deals with less expensive products (say, 
toys) with low purchase (input) prices. Even if  the number of workers, their 
wage rate, and the net profit are the same, the former category would have 
higher  sales  per  worker.  Moreover,  double  counting  in  the  multilayered 
wholesale sector may cloud the fig~re.~ 
Hence, a more accurate measure of  productivity is value added. Thus, we 
examine the value added that is net of input costs. Table 5.7 shows the value 
added in the distribution sector relative to that in the manufacturing sector. In 
this measure, the Japanese value added per worker is as high as that of the 
United States. In this measure, there is no evidence that the Japanese distri- 
bution sector is less efficient than that in the United States or Germany. 
5.3.3  Gross Profit Margin 
If  the efficiency of the distribution is measured by  how much extra a con- 
sumer has to pay on top of the manufacturer’s costs, the gross profit margin is 
an appropriate measure: 
(i)  gross profit margin ratio  = gross profit marginhales; 
(ii)  gross profit margin  = sales - merchandise costs 
merchandise costs  = merchandise purchase 
+ beginning-of-period inventories 
- end-of-period inventories. 
4. In order to understand why the sales per worker would be an incorrect statistic in the multi- 
layered wholesale system, consider the following example. Suppose that $100 is charged for sales 
of a product from the single-layered wholesale sector to the retail sector, and that 10 people are 
working in the (single-layer) wholesale sector. The $10 sales per worker would be recorded as the 
relevant statistic in this single-layered system. Next, suppose that the same product is sold three 
times in the multilayered wholesale (recall fig. 5.1): $50 by 5 people in the first wholesale layer, 
$70 by  7 people in the second layer, and $100 by  10 people in the third layer. Then the sales per 
capita in each layer is still $10 per person, and is so shown in the Japanese statistic. However, the 163  Is the Japanese Distribution System Really Inefficient? 
Table 5.7  The Ratio of Value Added per Worker in Different Sectors 
Japan  United States  Germany 
(  1985)  (1985)  (1985) 
Distribution sectoriindustry total  .76  .70  .68 
Distribution sectorhanufactwing 
Manufacturing sector/industry total  1.19  1.12  .95 
sector  .64  .63  .71 
Source: Maruyama et al. (1989). 
Or, 
(iii) gross profit margin 
operating expenses 
= net profits + operating expenses 
= payroll + rents + advertisement 
+ transportation + depreciation, 
and so on. 
Table 5.8 summarizes this measure. Contrary to popular belief, the Japa- 
nese gross profit margin is to be precise, lower than that of the United States 
and Germany. This shows that operating expenses and net profits are not par- 
ticularly high in Japan. Apparently small operations in Japan do not suffer 
from inefficiency. 
There are some caveats to this conclusion. First, although the Japanese 
small retail shops do not keep transportation costs (high physical distribution 
costs) and purchase costs down (no volume discounts applicable from whole- 
salers), they do operate on low  rent and  low  payroll. In fact, many  small 
retailers are operated by shop owners themselves whose stores are located in 
the front of  their principal residence. Many of  the shop owners are elderly 
couples who do not require high net profit or payroll. 
Second, several U.S.  economists have pointed out that an apparent high 
gross margin among U.S. wholesalers and retailers is a reflection of high in- 
cidences of  shoplifting, employee theft, and outright burglary in the United 
States5  Unfortunately, we do not have the figures for damages in the distribu- 
tion sector from such crimes. 
Third, it may be possible that the average wholesale and average retail fig- 
ures may be misleading due to some structural outliers. It is possible, but not 
examined carefully here, that dominant large-scale wholesalers or retailers 
pull the average up or that some nondistribution industry subgroup, such as 
“eating and drinking places,” may be distorting the average figures. Calcula- 
tion of gross margin and other statistics for industry subgroups and for estab- 
lishment-size subgroups is on the agenda of future research. 
“net” or true wholesale saldworker, i.e., how many people are needed to pass the goods to the 
retail level, should be $100 I  (10 + 7 + 5), much less than $10 per person. 
5. One of the eye-opening scenes on Japanese sidewalks is rows and rows of  vending machines 
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Table 5.8  Gross Profit Margin Ratio 
Gross Profit Margin  Japan  United States  Germany 
~~ 
Wholesale 
1978  11.9 
1981  N.A.  12.7 
I986  11.2  19.4  12.6‘ 
1978  27.0 
1981  N.A.  34.5 
1986  27.1  31.0  34.2= 
Retail 
Source: Maruyama et al. (1989) 
’1985. 
Fourth, considering retail and wholesale margins separately may be mis- 
leading in light of  the fact that the wholesalelretail ratios are quite different 
between Japan and other countries. The margin of the distribution system as a 
whole should be constructed to represent the notion of how much a consumer 
has to pay on top of the manufacturer’s cost. 
The last concern is taken up in Table 5.9, which describes the margin ag- 
gregate for wholesalers and retailers. The aggregate marginhetail sales is de- 
fined and decomposed as follows: 
(MW + MR) I R = (MWIW)  X (WIR) + (MRIR), 
where  MW  = gross  margin  of  wholesale,  MR  = gross  margin  of  retail, 
R = retail sales,  and W = wholesale sales. The figures are calculated and 
shown in table 5.9. 
This table also shows that the Japanese margin is quite comparable to Ger- 
many and slightly higher than the United  States. In sum, judging from the 
gross margin figures, we do not detect any inefficiencies in the Japanese dis- 
tribution system. 
5.3.4  Distribution Margin: Input-Output Approach 
In the preceding subsection, the gross margin was calculated from the Cen- 
sus of Commerce in Japan and the Census of Wholesale Trade and Census of 
Retail Trade in the United States. There is another way to calculate the gross 
margin in the entire distribution sector (the distribution margin, for short). 
The MITI (1988) calculated the distribution margin from the input-output 
table,  and  Nishimura  and  Tsubouchi  (1989) improved  upon  the  MITI’s 
method. The MITI reported that the U.S. distribution margin is about twice 
as much as the Japanese counterpart. 
Nishimura and Tsubouchi (1989) corrected the MITI figures by reclassify- 
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tobacco, rice, etc). Their finding is that the distribution margin for Japan is 
quite comparable to its U.S. counterpart. The numbers are reported in table 
5.10. (For details of the adjustment, please refer to Nishimura and Tsubouchi 
1989.) There are two caveats in comparing the Nishimura-Tsubouchi table and 
our table. First, the Nishimura-Tsubouchi table is only for consumer goods, 
while our table theoretically includes both consumer and production goods. 
Second, the survey that our table is based on is an establishment survey, while 
the  input-output  table  approach  does  not  double  count  trades  within  the 
wholesale industry. 
5.3.5  Summary 
In this section, various measures of efficiency in the distribution sector were 
examined.  In every measure,  Japan seems to be  as efficient as the United 
States. In the next section, the gross margin will be calculated for each sub- 
sector. 
Table 5.9  Distribution Margin: Census Approach 
Japan  United States  Germany 
Aggregate margin/ 
distribution sales: 
1978  15.6 
1981  N.A.  20.3 
1986  15.5  25.3  20.0' 
retail sales 
1978  63.4 
1981  N.A.  58.0 
1985  57.6  49.1  58.9" 
Aggregate margin/ 
Source: Maruyama et al. (1989) 
Note: Wholesale data are based on merchant wholesalers. Aggregate margin is defined in text 
41985. 
Table 5.10  Distribution Margin: 1-0 Approach 
Japan 
1980  1985  United States, 1977 
MITI ( 1988)  29.78  39.44 
Official Base  33.4  34.4  35.7 
Wholesale  9.9  8.2  N.A. 
Retail  23.5  26.2  N.A. 
Nishimura (1989)  36.8  38.6  35.7 
Source: Nishimura and Tsubouchi (1989) 166  Takatoshi Ito and Masayoshi Maruyama 
5.4  Efficiency at ’bo-Digit and Three-Digit Industry Levels 
5.4.1  Gross Margin, Operating Expenses, and Profits 
In this section we extend the analysis of  the preceding section by  two di- 
mensions. First, an analysis of gross margin will be conducted at the three- 
digit wholesale and two-digit retail industry levels. Since the Standard Indus- 
trial Code of Japan (JSIC) is slightly different from that of the United States 
(SIC), we have devised a matching table of the two SICs for the distribution 
sector. Second, gross margins will be decomposed into operating expenses 
and operating profits. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to 
compare operating expenses and operating profit for the U.S.  and Japanese 
two- and three-digit matching distribution subsectors. 
The study of three-digit industry level is necessary in order to account for 
the following issues in the aggregate data. First, the Japanese wholesale in- 
dustry include gigantic, general trading houses (sogo shoshu), to which no 
institution in the United States is comparable. These Japanese trading houses 
engage in export, import,  and trade between third countries, as well as the 
domestic distribution system. The same company may  deal with  importing 
F-16 fighters as well  as exporting cup noodles. These trading houses  are 
known to exploit scale economies, so that the low (operating) profit margin 
rate suffices for their success. They are quite different entities from those in 
the domestic distribution system. The effect of general trading houses can be 
eliminated by suppressing two-digit industry, JSIC 49. 
When the retail “aggregate” statistic is constructed, the United States tends 
to include “eating and drinking places” (SIC 58), while Japan excludes “eat- 
ing and drinking places” (general JSIC 59 or other JSIC 60). Since restaurants 
and fast-food outlets have quite different functions and cost characteristics 
from other retail shops, we  would be interested in comparable retail aggre- 
gates without eating and drinking places. 
First, let us describe how we match the two- and three-digit industries. The 
wholesale industry is divided into three two-digit industries in Japan and two 
two-digit industries (nondurables and durables) in the United States. Subdi- 
viding into the three-digit wholesale levels, the Japanese SIC tend to include 
more industries than each U.S. SIC. One exception is that textile and apparel 
are divided into two SICs in Japan, while those industries are aggregated into 
one in the United States. 
Second, in the two-digit retail level, the Japanese and U.S. SICs are quite 
comparable. After minor reclassification on the U.S. SIC, such as classifying 
gasoline stations into miscellaneous instead of motor vehicle (which really is 
meant to indicate automobile dealers), the two SICs are quite comparable (see 
Ito and Maruyama 1990, table 4-1, for a summary table of matching the two 
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Table 5.11 shows the results of such estimates. The following points sum- 
marize the major findings. 
1.  In  the wholesale sector,  the  gross margin  ratio in  the United  States 
(17.3% in  1982) is higher than that in Japan (14.0% in  1986), while in the 
retail sector, the gross margin in the United States (25.9%) is lower than that 
in Japan (27.0% in  1986). In both  sectors,  the operating expense ratio is 
higher in the United States, while the operating profit ratio is higher in Japan. 
If the general trading houses (JSIC 49) are included in the Japanese whole- 
sale sector, the operating expenses of the wholesale industry declines by about 
1.7%-2.4%  points and operating profit by  0.6%-0.9%  points.  Eating and 
drinking places are excluded in both countries. 
2. Among the three-digit wholesale sectors, operating expense ratios of all 
but one sector in the United States are higher than the comparable sectors in 
Japan. In contrast, the operating profit ratios in Japan are higher than those in 
the United States, except in three subsectors, JSIC 502, 504, and 514. 
Among the two-digit retail sectors, similar characteristics hold true. Oper- 
ating expense ratios of the United States are higher than those of Japan in four 
out of  six sectors, while the operating profit ratios for the United States are 
lower than those of Japan in all but one sector. 
In sum, the following conclusion emerges. The Japanese distribution sec- 
tors operate with less operating costs and earn higher operating profit. Casual 
arguments in the popular press, on the theme of the inefficient Japanese distri- 
bution system, are hardly consistent with the evidence presented in this paper. 
5.4.2  Labor Costs 
In order to investigate the detail of  the cost composition, the labor cost 
component is analyzed. The labor cost ratio is defined as total labor cost di- 
vided by the value added. (If the value added was normalized by the respective 
prices, the ratio would be equivalent to unit labor cost.) 
Table 5.12 compares the labor cost ratio. Among the three-digit wholesale 
sectors, the United States has a higher labor cost ratio in all but one (JSIC 
514) sector. Among the two-digit retail sectors, except for one (JSIC 58) sec- 
tor, the United States has a higher labor cost ratio. Therefore, it is evident that 
the labor share in value added is higher in the United States than in Japan. 
In sum, the share of labor costs in the distribution sector in Japan is no 
higher than in the United States. Hence, the findings in this section shows 
that, with respect to many criteria, such as the distribution margin, operating 
expenses, and the labor cost ratio, the Japanese subsectors in the distribution 
industry are, in general, as efficient as their U.S. counterparts. 
5.5  Concluding Remarks 
Let us summarize our findings, our interpretations, and implications as well 
as some caveats. In this paper, we have explained major characteristics of the 168  Takatoshi Ito and Masayoshi Maruyama 
Table 5.11  Sales, Expenses, and Profits Wholesale: Expense/Sales  ratio (EIS)  and 
Profithales ratio (PlS) 
JSIC 
United States, 
Japan, 1979  1982  Japan, 1986 
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Table 5.11  (continued) 
United States, 
Japan, 1979  1982  Japan, 1986 
JSIC  EIS  PIS  EIS  PIS  EIS  PIS 
Wholesale without gen- 





EIS  19.0 
PIS 
EIS  24.6 
PIS 
EIS  17.6 
PIS 
EIS  18.2 
PIS 
EIS  21.9 
PIS 
EIS  20.3 
PIS 














































Sources: For Japan, MITI Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, “Report on 5th Basic Survey 
of Commercial Structure and Activity”; United States, (1) Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Census, “1982 Census of Wholesale Trade, Industry Series, Measures of Value Produced, Capital 
Expenditures, Depreciable Assets, and Operating Expenses” and (2) Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Census, “1982 Census of Retail Trade, Industry Series, Measures of Value Produced, 
Capital Expenditures, Depreciable Assets, and Operating Expenses.” 
Notes: S = sales; E = operating expenses; P = operating profits. JSIC is the Japanese Standard 
Industrial Code, with the following changes: General Merchandise (shoshu)  in Japan is excluded; 
“general eating and drinking places” (JSIC 59), “other eating and drinking places” (JSIC 60), 
and “eating and drinking places” (US SIC 58) are excluded. The U.S SIC is matched to JSIC as 
follows: JSIC 502 = SIC 516; JSIC 503 = SIC 505 + 517; JSIC 504 = SIC 508 + 501; JSIC 
505 = SIC 503; JSIC 511 = SIC 513; JSIC 512 = SIC515; JSIC 513 = SIC 514 + 518; JSIC 
514 = SIC 512; JSIC 515 = SIC 502; JSIC 519 = SIC 504 + 507 + 509 + 511 + 519. JSIC 
53 = SIC 53; JSIC 54 = SIC 56; JSIC 55 = SIC 54 + 5921; JSIC 56 = SIC 55-554;  JSIC 57 
= SIC 52 + 57; JSIC 58 = SIC 554 + 5912. See It0 and Maruyama (1989, p. 33 and app. 2 
for details). Boldface type indicates numbers that are useful from the U.S.-Japan comparative 
perspective. 170  Takatoshi It0 and Masayoshi Maruyama 
Table 5.12  Labor Cost Ratio 
JSIC  Japan, 1979  United States, 1982  Japan, 1986 
Wholesale 
49 
















































































Source: See table 5.11, 
Japanese distribution system and presented  some quantitative measures  on 
“efficiency” of  the distribution system.  Although the Japanese distribution 
system appears to be very different from its U.S. counterpart, its performance, 
measured by value added, gross margin, operating expenses, and labor costs, 
is quite comparable with U.S. performance. Hence, we do not have any evi- 
dence to conclude that the Japanese characteristics are symptoms of  ineffi- 
ciency. 
When our findings are combined with other pieces of evidence, such as the 
fact that the retail prices are, in general, higher in Japan, and that the behavior 
of Japanese exporters can be viewed as “pricing to the market” (see Marston, 
in  this  volume),  the  following scenario seems plausible.  The keiretsu,  or 
whatever structures make possible vertical restraints and resale price mainte- 
nance, may segregate the Japanese market from the rest of the world. Then 
the pricing-to-the-market behavior becomes possible, and the Japanese man- 
ufacturers seem to exercise this power. In that sense, the distribution system 
is guilty of causing the price differential between Japan and abroad. 
However, whatever rents accrued from vertical restraints and the pricing- 
to-the-market behavior, they are not shared by  the distribution sector, or the 171  Is the Japanese Distribution System Really Inefficient? 
distribution sector itself does not incur extra (operating) expenses that appar- 
ently resulted  from the  Japanese characteristics.  The Japanese  distribution 
system is as efficient as its U.S. counterpart once the system receives, as an 
input to the “pipeline,” the goods from manufacturers. 
Finally, let us comment on a U.S.-Japanese conflict with regard to the Jap- 
anese distribution system. An opinion that considers institutions and business 
practices in the Japanese distribution system as a significant non-tariff barrier 
is gaining momentum in the United States and is frequently mentioned in the 
recent “structural impediments” talks between the United States and Japan. 
Business leaders and government officials in the United States suspect that the 
Japanese distribution system discriminates against  imports from the United 
States and other countries. By removing the barriers, it is suggested that the 
Japanese would import more manufactured goods and the trade imbalances 
would diminish. 
The structural impediments initiative (SII) has recently prompted two types 
of  reactions in Japan. First, “revisionists” in Japan, mainly reacting to attacks 
from the United States, emphasize that the Japanese characteristics could be a 
result of “rational behavior and free choices” of the Japanese consumers (see, 
e.g., Itoh, in this volume, and MITI 1989). Second, “reformers” consider that 
the Japanese characteristics do represent some sort of market imperfection, by 
regulations and/or by rent-seeking behavior of oligopolists. 
Both domestic reformers and U.S. negotiators would regard some regula- 
tions,  institutions, and practices  as adverse to consumers’ welfare  and as 
counterproductive to international  efficiency.  Reformers may  welcome the 
U.S.  demands, because they are politically  helpful  as a “foreign pressure” 
(gaiatsu)  from the United States. However, reformers may be quite different 
from the U. S.  negotiation team in assessing the effects of the structural imped- 
iments on trade balances or potential benefits to American firms. Reformers 
think that removing structural bamers might not reduce by a significant pro- 
portion  the Japanese trade surplus, especially  the bilateral  trade  imbalance 
between Japan and United States, but that it would surely improve the Japa- 
nese consumers’ welfare. 
Both true revisionists  and true reformers would not object to dismantling 
Dai-ten Ho, or at least to implement, on the part of  MITI, the law without 
favoring small stores. If what revisionist claim is correct, constructing a large 
retail store would not affect consumers’ behavior, which prefers frequent visits 
to neighborhood stores. Reformers think  that the Dai-ten Ho causes some 
distortion  in the retail market. Although  the retail sales per establishment  is 
increasing, the pace of  catching up to the United  States and Germany is too 
slow. Hence, the Dai-ten Ho should be significantly weakened, if not abol- 
ished. 
This paper has, we hope, clarified with ample quantitative evidence, one 
particular  aspect, namely efficiency, of  the distribution system in Japan. It is 
our hope that this discussion stimulates further research in this field. 172  Takatoshi Ito and Masayoshi Maruyama 
Postscript. After this paper was completed, there were notable changes with 
regard to the Dui-ten Ho (Large-scale Retail Store Law). In May 1990, MITI 
revised its ministry guidelines so that it would be possible for a store to open 
for business within a year and a half after the intent to do so is expressed to 
the MITI local office. Since previously it was common for opening to be de- 
layed up to three years, this revision could result in a significant shortening of 
the process. 
In  May  1991, the Diet enacted a revision of  the Dui-ten Ho.  Under the 
revised law, sho cho kyo (a local committee to review applications) was abol- 
ished, with the dui ten shin (a national council on large stores) now respon- 
sible to examine applications, applying a common national standard. How- 
ever, small stores are planning to pressure local business groups to establish 
an alternative to sho cho kyo (the alternative would be called sho mon kyo). 
Moreover, the revised law is not specific enough to predict whether significant 
change will take place. For example, dui ten shin (as of August 1991) does 
not specify standards for accepting or rejecting applications. 
Hence, it remains to be seen whether the procedural change of  May  1990 
and the May  1991 revision of the law will in fact change the process in  any 
meaningful way. 
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